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Strategy Wanted: The European Union 
and Strategic Partnerships 
Thomas Renard 
The European Union (EU) has nine strategic 
partnerships  with  third  countries,  but  the 
rationale behind these is far from evident, and 
the  implementation  questionable.  Therefore, 
the raison d’être of these partnerships has been 
largely questioned within Europe, but also by 
our partners. This brief proposes a critical look 
at  the  concept  of  strategic  partnerships,  and 
make  some  recommendations  to  EU  policy-
makers. 
A few days after José Manuel Barroso’s first ever 
“State  of  the  Union”  speech,  in  which  the 
importance of EU strategic partners was once again 
emphasized,  and  ahead  of  the  16  September 
European  Council  dedicated  in  part  to  strategic 
partnerships, this brief proposes a critical look at the 
concept  of  strategic  partnerships,  from  an  EU 
perspective. 
A VAGUE LIST OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS 
There  is  no  official  list  of  the  EU  strategic 
partnerships, and probably only a few people could 
name them all. In fact, depending on the meaning 
that is given to the partnerships, depending on the 
audience,  or  depending  on  the  speaker,  the  list 
varies greatly. For instance, in his first foreign policy 
speech at the College of Europe in February 2010, 
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Herman Van Rompuy said: “We need to review 
and strengthen our relationship with key partners. 
I am above all thinking about the United States, 
Canada,  Russia,  China, J a p a n ,  I n d i a ,  B r a z i l ” 1.  In 
July of the same year, at a conference in Athens, 
Catherine Ashton came up with a different list of 
strategic  partners:  “We  need  to  invest  in 
partnerships,  keeping  up  the  work  with  our 
‘established partnerships’ such as the US, Russia, 
Japan  and  Canada,  and  focussing  too  on 
developing our relationships with powers that are 
emerging  or  have  emerged,  China,  India,  Brazil, 
South Africa, Indonesia”2. 
However,  a  careful  review  of  EU  documents 
reveals that the EU has – or is working on – nine 
strategic partnerships with third countries: Brazil, 
Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South 
Africa, and the United States. 
It is not entirely clear how the EU reached this list 
or  what  is  the  exact  reasoning  behind  it.  Some 
countries (e.g. the US) are considered to be natural 
partners of the EU, whereas others (e.g. China and 
Russia)  are  considered  simply  to  be  too  big  to 
ignore. As for the other countries on the list, the 
strategic  rationale  is  far  less  evident.  Their 
inclusion sometimes seems to be more the result 
of political and institutional games than of a true 
strategic reflection.  
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A  first  argument  developed  here  is  that  the  nine 
strategic partnerships are neither identical nor equal.  
Not all strategic partnerships are identical. Although all 
these relationships are qualified to be a “strategic 
partnership”  in  either  formal  or  informal 
documents, they did not come into existence in the 
same way, nor are they at the same stage.  
On  the  one  hand,  the  relationships  with  Canada, 
Russia,  the  US  and  Japan  (CRUSAJ)  – t h e  
established  powers  – a r e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  j u s t  a  f e w  
core  documents  and  many  sectoral  dialogues. 
Despite the use of “strategic partnership” rhetoric 
during  bilateral  Summits,  there  is  no  official 
document  entitled  “strategic  partnership”  with 
these  countries.  The  EU  considers  these  long-
standing  relationships  to  be  inherently  “strategic” 
for various reasons and their natural evolution did 
not  require  over-formalisation  into  one  single 
document. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  EU  adopted  documents 
explicitly entitled “strategic partnership” with Brazil, 
India, China, South Africa and Mexico (BICSAM) – 
the emerging powers – because it had to adapt to 
the  rapid  emergence  of  these  newcomers  on  the 
global stage. As the relationship did not evolve as 
naturally as with the previous category of countries, 
and  as  bilateral  agreements  with  them  were 
blossoming  in  every  direction  following  their 
emergence,  the  EU  granted  them  a  new  kind  of 
reward to maintain a comprehensive framework for 
the  relationship  and  ensure  their  continued 
commitment.  In  this  new  mechanism,  there  is 
always a Commission Communication endorsed by 
the  Council  and  then  approved  at  a  Summit. 
Among  this  category,  there  seems  to  be  a  subtle 
distinction  between  the  necessary “ s t r a t e gic 
partnership” [“EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing 
Responsibilities”];  the  established “ s t r a t e g i c  
partnership” [“An EU-India Strategic Partnership”]; 
and  the  “strategic  partnership”  as  an  objective 
[“Towards  a  Strategic  Partnership”  with  South 
Africa, Brazil, Mexico].3 
Not  all  strategic  partnerships  are  equal.  Strategic 
partners  can  be  categorized  as  follows.  (1)  The 
essential partner: The strategic partnership with the 
US seems to be above any other partnership as the 
transatlantic  relationship  is  certainly  no  less 
important in today’s uncertain global environment 
than it was in the past. This partnership is essential 
because little can be done without the support of 
the American superpower. (2) The pivotal partners: 
Our strategic partnership with Russia and Chi na,  
and  to  a  certain  extent  with  Brazil  and  India,  is 
more  complex  but  almost  as  important  to  cope 
with  contemporary  global  challenges  and  achieve 
core  EU  foreign  policy  objectives.  These 
partnerships  are  pivotal  because  they  can  tip  the 
international  balance  to  the  benefit  or  to  the 
detriment  of  the  EU  depending  on  how  we 
approach them. (3) The natural allies: The strategic 
partnerships  with  Canada  and  Japan  appear  less 
strategic  than  those  with  the  US  or  the  BRIC 
countries.  However,  these  two  countries  are  not 
negligible as they are like-minded countries with a 
significant footprint in international affairs (notably 
through their presence in the G8 and the G20). (4) 
The regional partners: Mexico and South Africa are 
two dwarfs among the strategic partners of the EU 
although they can bring a certain added value at the 
regional level (probably more obviously in the case 
of South Africa than that of Mexico). 
A	 ﾠSTRATEGIC	 ﾠDISTINCTION	 ﾠ
In order to better illustrate the distinctions made 
above between the nine strategic partnerships with 
third countries, this brief resorts to a 3 by 2 matrix, 
differentiating  between  the  level  of  strategic 
importance  of  the  partners  on  one  axis  and  the 
level  of  formalisation  of  the  partnership  on  the 
other axis (see Figure 1). Hence we make a clear 
distinction  between  the  importance  of  EU 
“strategic partners”4 (vertical axis) and the formal 
“strategic partnerships” that the EU has concluded 
(horizontal  axis).  All  the  nine  countries  in  the 
matrix are the so-called “strategic partners” of the 
EU.  However,  this  brief  argues,  in  reality  some   3 
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partners  are  more  strategic  than  others  and  a 
distinction should be made between them. 
Formally, a strategic partnership acts as a sort of 
umbrella  for  the  relationship,  as  it  offers  a 
comprehensive  framework  for  the  two  partners, 
and  raises  the  level  of  the  dialogue  (to  Summit 
level).  These  partnerships  appear  in  the  right 
column of the matrix. 
Such  strategic  partnerships  create  a  privileged 
relationship with rapidly emerging global players, as 
they seek to develop a feeling of mutual confidence 
between the EU and the partner through bilateral 
consultation  and  coordination.  Such  privileged 
relationship  is  likely  to  strengthen  bilateral 
cooperation on sensitive issues of global or regional 
concern.  The  establishment  of  such  privileged 
relationship  is  crucial  as  the  nature  of  the 
relationship  with  emerging  powers  has 
fundamentally evolved in the last decade in spite of 
the fact that most of these relationships are quite 
old (we celebrated 35 years of EU-China relations 
in 2010). 
There is also a more immediate consequence to 
announcing  such  a  strategic  partnership:  it 
automatically raises the status of the third country, 
which is to say that the EU recognizes the growing 
importance and influence of the strategic partner, 
but  it  also  acknowledges  its  new  responsibilities 
and obligations as a global player. Such strategic 
partnerships are both cause and consequence of an 
intensification  (or  densification?)  and  a 
diversification  (e.g.  proliferation  of  sectoral 
dialogues)  of  the  relationship,  resulting  in  a 
deepened  coordination  at  the  EU  level  among 
relevant DGs and between the Commission and 
the Council. 
However,  these  formal  strategic  partnerships 
encompass only half of all strategic partners of the 
EU. O n e  c o u l d  e v e n  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e y  i n c l u d e  
several countries that are not particularly strategic 
to  the  EU.  In  any  case,  the  strategic  nature  of 
those  documents  is  questionable  and 
implementation often limited.5 Hence, we should 
distinguish the formal strategic partnerships from 
what could be called a “true strategic partnership”,   4 
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or  eventually  a  “grand  strategic  partnership”  in 
reference to a potential EU grand strategy, yet to be 
elaborated.6 
A  true  strategic  partner  can  be  defined  as  a  key 
global  player  which  has  a  pivotal  role  in  solving 
global challenges – in the sense that the EU cannot 
hope  to  solve  these  issues  without  the  positive 
contribution of that partner – and which is centrally 
important  to  enhance  effective  multilateralism 
globally  – e . g .  b y  c o o rdinating  our  position  with 
those strategic partners in multilateral forums. The 
strategic  partnerships  in  this  sense  go  beyond 
bilateral  relations  and  focus  on  the 
instrumentalisation of this bilateral relationship for 
broader ends.  
However, as illustrated in Copenhagen, not all our 
strategic partners share the EU’s global priorities or 
our  effective  multilateral  approach  to  global 
challenges.7 A  k e y  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h e s e  s t r a t e g i c  
partnerships should precisely be to avoid an infinite 
repetition  of  the  Copenhagen  scenario  by 
encouraging  a  stronger  relationship  built  around 
shared objectives in a long-term perspective. This 
idea of shared objectives might be more productive 
than the one of common interests and values, as the 
latter  is  more  likely  to  lead  to  clashes  with  our 
partners.  Indeed,  the  emphasis  on  values  – a s  
important as it is to maintain on the bilateral agenda 
– w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  r e m a i n  a  c o n t i n u o u s  s o u r c e  o f  
tensions, whereas common interests may in practice 
equally  lead  to  cooperation  and  competition. 
Therefore,  “shared  objectives”  appears  to  be  a 
more  constructive  concept.  The  point  is  not  to 
erase the value dimension from our foreign policy 
however,  but  rather  to  opt  for  a  less  direct  and 
perhaps  more  constructive  approach  of  value 
promotion,  in  which  our  values  will  be  slowly 
accepted as a result of shared objectives, not as a 
result of unilateral EU pressure.  
The list of our true strategic partners should flow 
from an assessment of the strategic importance of 
third  countries  to  achieve  the  core  EU  foreign 
policy objectives. Given that a grand strategy still 
needs to be elaborated, it is rather difficult to come 
up  with  the  most  adequate  list  of  true  strategic 
partners. However, the US, Russia and China will 
undoubtedly  figure  on  the  list,  although  for 
different  reasons.  India  and  Brazil  are  likely  to 
make it to the list as well. The discussion remains 
open for the other partners. 
We should foresee that these strategic partnerships 
will be variable in their content, with some global 
objectives common to all partnerships and some 
other  global  objectives  tailor-made  for  each 
partnership,  depending  on  the  particular  added-
value of each partner. In terms of common global 
objectives,  we  could  envision  for  instance  the 
promotion of effective multilateralism, an element 
at the core of the ESS, although this will not be 
unproblematic  given  that  most  strategic  partners 
“support multilateralism in a selective way, in so far 
as it fosters their interests”8. 
Regarding tailor-made objectives, the list could be 
long  for  each  partnership,  and  we  will  mention 
here  just  a  few  illustrations  of  how  the  strategic 
partnerships could be used to fulfil some EU grand 
objectives.  We  could  for  instance  envision  an 
enhanced cooperation between the EU and the US 
over  global  financial  stability  now  that  we  have 
experienced  the  devastating  effects  of  a  global 
financial  crisis.  The  EU  and  China  could  work 
together  on  a  common  approach  to  sustainable 
development  in  Africa,  in  line  with  the  UN 
millennium  goals,  given  that  there  is  a  growing 
awareness that a sustainable Africa is in the interest 
of Chinese and European long-term investments. 
The EU as one of the biggest financial contributors 
to UN peacekeeping operations, and India as one 
of  the  biggest  troops  contributors  to  UN 
peacekeeping  operations  could  work  together  in 
improving  UN  crisis  management  mechanisms, 
hence making a better use of their resources. The 
EU and Brazil could work together in combating 
narco-traffic,  with  an  emphasis  on  West  Africa 
where  drug  trafficking  destroy  any  chance  of   5 
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development and stability in the entire region. The 
list could go on.  
However,  while  following  its  grand  objectives 
through strategic partnerships, the EU should not 
show  an  excess  of  naivety.  Firstly,  it  should 
recognize  that  there  will  be  major  hindrances  to 
promoting  a  common  approach  to  issues  and 
challenges shared by all strategic partners, as some 
of  them  have  hardly  reconcilable  positions,  e.g. 
China  and  India  on  Security  Council  reform,  but 
also  given  the  growing  normative  disconnect 
between the EU and some of its strategic partners.9 
Secondly,  the  EU  should  also  recognize  that 
working  together  with  one  partner  could  trigger 
negative  views  among  other  partners,  or  worse, 
harm  the  bilateral  relationship.  For  instance, 
cooperating  with  the  Chinese  Navy  to  secure 
maritime routes in East Africa certainly fits into the 
perspective of strategic partnerships, but it triggers 
intense worries in Japan and India, which see the 
deployment  of  the  Chinese  fleet  as  a  real-life 
exercise  and  a  threat  to  the  regional  balance  of 
power in Asia. 
The  subtle  distinction  operated  in  this  brief 
between “formal strategic partnerships” and “true 
(or grand) strategic partnerships” is fundamental for 
the EU to find its place in the international system: 
identifying its true strategic partners is part of the 
process for the EU itself to become a true global 
strategic player. 
TOWARDS  EFFECTIVE  STRATEGIC 
PARTNERSHIPS 
At a crucial juncture in history marked by Europe’s 
declining weight in the global order and by a global 
climate of economic difficulty, EU member states 
could  actually  see  an  opportunity  for  more 
cooperation rather than less, and invest in the EU’s 
capacity to become a true global strategic player. If 
member states realise that their power as individual 
nation-states  is  threatened  by  changes  they  are 
powerless to stop, this could be a strong incentive 
for  further  cooperation  at  the  EU  level.  If 
consensus can be reached and the EU can show its 
partners the added value of engaging with the EU 
as a whole rather than with its parts, that will go a 
long  way  toward  ensuring  effective  strategic 
partnerships in the future. 
Time  has  come  for  the  EU  to  think  and  act 
strategically. This brief has shown that despite its 
strategic  rhetoric,  the  EU  still  lacks  genuine 
strategic  thinking.  Discussions  over  strategic 
partnerships will offer a good test, although a test 
that the EU can hardly afford to fail, for the stakes 
are too high in today’s interpolar environment. The 
EU needs true strategic partners, just as much as a 
more strategic EU is needed globally. The road will 
be long and bumpy, of course, but the way back 
looks even worse. 
One can legitimately hope that the 16 September 
European Council will address some of the issues 
related  to  the  strategic  partnerships.  However, 
many  fundamental  questions  will  remain 
unanswered.  Perhaps,  the  set-up  of  a  special 
working  group  composed  of  policy-makers  and 
experts could be envisioned to address them. The 
following is a list of recommendations for the EU 
(and the working group eventually) to consider in 
future discussions on EU strategic partnerships.  
 The EU should first and foremost reflect on the 
meaning  and  purpose  of  strategic  partnerships, 
starting  with  establishing  a  clear  distinction 
between  the  different  types  of  strategic 
partnership identified in this brief. A very general 
definition of “strategic partnership” could be the 
following:  It  is  about  instrumentalizing  our 
relationship  with  true  strategic  partners  (to  be 
identified)  in  order  to  reach  a  set  of  grand 
objectives  that  go  beyond  bilateral  goals  (to  be 
identified  by  a  grand  strategy)  within  a  long-term 
framework. 
 The  list  of  true  strategic  partners  need  not  be 
made  public:  the  issue  is  a  matter  of 
prioritization,  not  one  of  creating  new 
documents. We should not sign new agreements   6 
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with  our  strategic  partners  or  come  up  with 
something  such  as  “grand  strategic  partnership” 
documents.  These  partnerships  need  to  remain 
informal  to  become  really  effective:  flexibility, 
adaptation,  reciprocity,  tradeoffs  and 
compromises c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  c o r e  o f  s u c h  
partnerships. 
 The  EU  should  also  reflect  on  the  concrete 
implications of having a strategic partnership for 
the implementation of its foreign policy. Should 
the EU have a bigger delegation in grand strategic 
partner countries e.g.? Should the EU have a more 
specialized staff in relevant units and delegations? 
Should  the  EU  have a military attaché in those 
delegations? Etc. 
 All  strategic  partnerships  should  have  a  certain 
amount  of  common  elements  that  relate  to  the 
grand  strategy  of  the  EU,  even  if  that  grand 
strategy is only an informal one, all we need to 
know  being  the  fundamental  objectives  of  EU 
foreign policy. But each partnership should entail 
a tailor-made part in order to take the best of each 
partner for achieving fundamental foreign policy 
objectives. 
 In order to become a true strategic partner, the 
EU  should  think  thoroughly  about  the  added 
value it can offer to its strategic partners over its 
individual  member  states:  what  advantage  do 
strategic  partners  have  in  dealing  with  the  EU 
rather than with member states? This will require 
for the EU to show more coherence in its foreign 
policy, but also for it to grow more assertive by 
focusing  on  its  strengths,  such  as  its  economic 
power.  This  will  further  require  more 
coordination with member states, especially given 
that some of them also have strategic partnerships 
of their own with EU strategic partners. France, 
Germany and the UK should not abandon their 
own  policies  towards  China  because  it  is  a 
strategic  partner  of  the  EU.  However,  member 
states  should  make  sure  that  their  policies  are 
coherent with EU policies, or at least that they do 
not hamper EU grand objectives. 
 Finally, the EU should think about the tradeoffs 
it is willing to make with its strategic partners in 
order to achieve its fundamental foreign policy 
objectives. Indeed, strategic partnerships are not 
only about EU interests, they are also about the 
interests  of  our  partners,  and  about  where  the 
interests of both parties meet. This kind of trade-
off exercise will not be easy, especially given that 
most of our strategic partners have a much more 
instrumental vision of the partnerships, yet it is a 
necessary  condition  to  make  the  strategic 
partnerships  work.  The  EU’s  staunchly  upright 
stance on human rights e.g. presents problems in 
its  relationship  with  the  United  States,  not  to 
mention Russia, China, and India. The EU will 
accordingly need to develop a new approach, less 
confrontational and more constructive, and not 
judge each case within a vacuum.  
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